We d e v elop a numerically solved equilibrium model of the labor market to study the e ect of unemployment insurance (UI) over the business cycle. This model combines sequential job search, optimal job o er, layo , and recall decisions, an aggregate productivity cycle, and details of an actual (namely, the Canadian) UI system. Optimal worker ( rm) behavior is characterized by a dynamic programming problem conditional upon beliefs about the behavior of rms (workers). In equilibrium beliefs are consistent with the optimal decisions of other agents. The equilibrium beliefs are found using a nested algorithm in which simulations of the economy are used to iterate on beliefs while re-solivng for optimal decisions. Some of the model's parameters are used to match simulated moments to data on labor market outcomes for young Canadian men. Simulations of recent c hanges to the UI system suggest that they will raise average unemployment rates and increase short-term layo s and recalls among young Canadians. Eliminating UI altogether would sign cantly lower the unemployment rate among young men as well as lower average observed wages. Under the previous UI rules each m o n th of UI is associated with .86 more months of unemployment than without UI. Under the new rules the ratio is 1.46: each t wo people on UI can be thought of as generating a third unemployed person not receiving UI through the changes in rm and worker decisions generated by the UI policy. In general, UI policy is found to have complicated e ects on the timing of cycles in wages and other variables relative t o t h e productivity cycle. JEL Classi cation: L2, D2, J3, C4
I. INTRODUCTION
In many developed countries the public unemployment insurance (UI) system introduces complex incentives for both individuals and rms. For rms, UI a ects decisions to layo and recall former workers and to o er jobs to outside workers. For individuals, UI a ects decisions to quit or change jobs and to accept job o ers while unemployed. While a large literature has studied UI both theoretically and empirically (see e.g. Atkinson and Mickelwright 1991) , our understanding of UI has been limited in at least three respects. First, most models of UI have focussed on one side of the labor market or the other. Consequently, little is known about the equilibrium e ects of UI. Second, most theoretical and empirical work has relied on stylized descriptions of UI eligibility rules. Therefore, the e ect of speci c changes in UI policies is di cult to predict either theoretically or empirically. Third, most theoretical models of the impact of UI adopt stationary (non-cyclical) environments, yet it is likely that UI programs with dynamic elements (such a s m i n i n um work requirements) have signi cant e ects on the cyclical properties of the labor market. This paper develops a labor market equilibrium model that combines sequential job search, optimal job o er, layo , and recall decisions, an aggregate productivity cycle, and details of an actual (namely, the Canadian) UI system. Because of the nature and the number of extensions to theoretically tractable models, the model is solved numerically. We solve for the equilibrium through an iterative procedure that includes fully solving the dynamic programming problems for workers and rms given their beliefs and then simulating the resulting economy in order to reconcile outcomes with beliefs. Except for a simplifying assumption about wage determination, our framework builds on the matching model of Mortenson and Pissarides (1994) . To set parameters of the model, we calibrate the aggregate productivity cycle to the Canadian economy, a n d w e set the parameters of the UI system to match the system in place in Canada from 1981 to 1989. We x time discount factors at realistic values, and the remaining parameters were set to yield simulated moments similar 1 to those found in data on the labor market outcomes of young Canadian men. While the computational burdens of the model make rigorous estimation of the model's parameters infeasible, we are able to nd reasonable parameters with which to perform policy experiments. Furthermore, the computational burden of our equilibrium notion, which limits strategic interaction between workers and rms to a small set of consistent probabilities, is much smaller compared to that of the infeasible full Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
We assess the e ects of UI on young men by s i m ulating the equilibrium response to two changes in the system, the complete removal of UI and the major changes made to UI in Canada since 1990. Our major results include the following. In comparison to the baseline of the 1980s, changes to UI in Canada since 1990 are found to raise unemployment r a t e s and to exasperate the e ect of a recession. Average wages are lowered slightly as well by the change in policies. Rates of unemployment are higher because there is more churning in the labor market. Higher rates of unemployment a n d l o wer wages are accompanied by more layo s and more recalls of laid-o workers. These results are somewhat ironic, because changes to Canadian UI were motivated by a sense that the existing system made it too easy for rms and workers to use regular layo s accompanied by UI bene ts. Bene t rates were reduced and eligibility rules tightened. The unintended consequence is that these changes make it easier for rms to nd workers and to recall laid o workers. The shorter wait for an acceptable job makes entering unemployment less costly for workers, thereby making it easier for rms to lay them o for short periods than under the older rules.
Simulations which eliminate the Canadian UI system altogether show that unemployment would fall uniformly over the business cycle. Under the previous UI rules, each person on UI is associate with a little less than one extra unemployed person relative to the no UI equilibrium. But under the new UI rules each person on UI is associated with 1.46 more unemployed. Thus, moving UI rules partially towards the elimination of UI does not necessarily lead to a partial movement t o wards the equlibrium without UI. We also show h o w unemployment durations, reservation wages, and other variables are a ected in equilibrium by UI policy. 2
In our framework the productivity of a job is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The aggregate shocks are cyclical and generate a productivity (or business) cycle. Idiosyncratic shocks lead to simultaneous layo s, quits, and recalls in each state of the business cycle. Firms respond to low productivity b y l a ying o workers, and when productivity recovers they attempt to recall separated workers and possibly post a (costly) outside o er. Workers search both on and o the job, and they face state-dependent c hances of layo , recall, and job o ers. Unemployment insurance directly alters the value workers place on layo s, recalls, quits, and job o ers. In equilibrium UI also indirectly alters optimal decisions made by rms through changes in beliefs about worker decisions. The combination of equilibrium beliefs and actions generate endogenous probabilities of match formation and destruction. The model also generates plausible predictions for many labor market phenomenon that other models ignore for the sake of simplicity, s u c h as job-to-job transitions, temporary layo s and recalls, quits into unemployment, and a non-degenerate distribution of wages. Burdett and Mortensen (1980) rst analyzed a model of sequential job search that included an implicit layo probability as part of the endogenously determined labor contract. They consider the introduction of UI into the model, but leave several aspects of the labor market unexplained, including inter rm mobility f o r w orkers who have become attached to a rm. Hansen and _ Imrohoroglu (1992) analyze the e ect of UI in the presence of liquidity constraints and moral hazard. They nd that plausible values of UI parameters may induce large e ciency losses in the economy. Their analysis includes potentially in nite duration of UI bene ts and a single wage. More recently, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1996) and Andolfatto and Gomme (1995) also develop general equilibrium models of stylized UI systems. Furthermore, di erences in UI rules have been o ered as an explanation for di erences in unemployment patterns among Canada, the U.S., and European countries (Beach and Kaliski (1983) , Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), and Bean (1994) .). Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994) study equilibrium models of job creation and destruction in 3 cyclical economies. These models include exogenously determined matching functions and job destruction rates. Andofatto (1996) includes labor market search in a business cycle model.
II. THE MODEL
The Labor Market
The labor market consists of a large number of ex-ante identical workers and ex-ante identical rms. The number of potential jobs in the labor market, lled and vacant, equals the number of workers. The economy is subject to autocorrelated aggregate shocks to productivity which generate a business cycle. The aggregate state s takes on three values, s 2 f s l s m s h g, that correspond to periods of low, medium, and high productivity. The common component of productivity in state s is denoted s . O v er time s follows a Markov process with transition probabilities denoted P ss 0 . W orkers and rms observe the value of s and know the transition probabilities. For the numerical analysis, we set m = 0 and l = ; h , leaving one free value, h , t h e a verage level of productivity in the high state, which w e c hoose as part of the moment-matching described in section III.
In each period, a percentage l d of workers die and are replaced by new workers who are unemployed and have n o e m p l o yment experience. A proportion d of un lled jobs are also destroyed each period and replaced with new un lled jobs that have n o w orkers to recall. (All probabilities of actions taken by w orkers are denoted with l, and all probabilities of actions taken by rms are denoted with .) Each period all workers and rms receive private information. Workers may receive an outside job o er, which is unobserved by their current rm. Firms observe a job-speci c productivity s h o c k d r a wn from a discrete distribution of values f 1 2 : : : N g, indexed by i. W orkers do not observe t h e v alue of i . F or the numerical analysis, we set the values of to be equally likely and to be spaced over the range ;B B], where B > 0 i s c hosen. 4
Jobs are de ned by a rm-worker match M, w h i c h is drawn from a discrete distribution of values fM 1 M 2 : : : M Nw g, indexed by k, with corresponding wages w k . W e assume that the worker and rm share the match v alue, implying wages take the form w k M k :
(1) The worker's share 2 0 1] of the match-speci c product is xed. Each w age and corresponding match v alue have the same probability 1
Nw . F or our numerical analysis the distribution of wages and match v alues depend on two parameters and 2 : w k = w min + e x p ( ;1 ((k ; 0:5)=N w )) + )
where ;1 denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribution function and w min is a wage that is just ineligible for unemployment insurance under the Canadian UI rules.
In a Nash bargaining model of wages (such as the one estimated by E c kstein and Wolpin 1995), the worker and rm would share the surplus value of the match not simply the current shared component of the match a s w e assume. Several features of a our model make t h e continued search while bargaining framework inappropriate and extensions of it too di cult. First, both the worker and the rm can leave the match a t a n y time and possibly return later. So while the alternative to accepting a new match is simply further search, a bargaining model of this situation would have to contend with strategic interactions in all periods after the match begins. Our assumption of private information about productivity and outside alternatives is also consistent with our simple model of wages. Workers can capture the rent from their outside alternatives only by accepting them, and rms can only avoid large negative s h o c ks by l a ying o the worker.
The rm's pro t from employing a worker in one period equals the job's total productivity minus the wage, which using (1) can be written s + 1 ; w k + i :
There are a total of 3 N w N distinct values for rm pro ts. The match does not end when the worker separates from the rm, because the rm can attempt to recall the worker. The 5 match ends when the job is vacant and either it is destroyed (exogenously) or the rm nds a new worker willing to form a new match. Workers and rms form beliefs about the actions of other agents which take the form of probabilities contingent upon the aggregate state of the economy s. W orkers form beliefs about whether rms will issue recalls (r), layo s (l), job o ers while unemployed (o), and outside job o ers while on the job (j). We write the vector of worker beliefs about these events as:
Firms form beliefs about whether workers will quit their job (q), accept recalls (r), and accept a new job o er (o):
In equilibrium beliefs about the other side's actions are consistent with optimal behavior. Details of the solution method are given in Appendix 3. The sequencing of rm and worker decisions and actions is represented in Figure 1 beginning in an arbitrary period, t. If a job is lled, production occurs and the worker is employed and paid. If the job is empty, n o w ages are paid, the rm incurs no costs, and the job disappears with (exogenous) probability l d . 1 After production is completed, a worker may leave the labor market with (exogenous) probability d and upon leaving is replaced by an unemployed worker with no employment experience. If an employed worker leaves the labor market, she also vacates her employment position. Her current rm begins period t+1 with an empty job.
At the end of period t new workers and jobs appear, the economy's new aggregate state is revealed, and each rm observes its next idiosyncratic shock, t+1 i . Firms with a lled job decide whether or not to lay o i t s w orker. Firms with a vacant job decide whether or not to recall the previous worker or whether to post an outside o er. Recall and layo 1 We assume that l d is constant o ver the business cycle, but jobs are more likely to be empty during a recession which generates an endogenous cycle in the job destruction rates. 6
announcements go out and unemployed workers respond to recall o ers. Firms whose recalls fail or who did not issue recalls now post o ers if they planned to do so. New rms also decide whether to post o ers or to leave t h e j o b v acant again until next period. One randomly selected worker receives each job o er and the worker-rm match v alue is revealed to both sides. Workers decide to accept or reject each o er based on the wage associated with the match and their current situation. After all o ers have been made and either accepted or rejected, workers inform their current employers whether they will quit or remain on the job for production period t + 1. Production in period t + 1 then begins and the within-period sequencing of events is repeated.
Unemployment Insurance
The UI regulations in the model mimic those in Canada in 1989. 2 It includes a longer entrance requirement for repeaters than for claimants who did not collect UI bene ts in the previous year, duration of bene ts that depends on the duration of the previous employment spell, a xed replacement ratio, and minimum and maximum bene t levels. If currently employed, the duration of UI bene ts for which o n e w ould be eligible upon becoming unemployed depends on the number of periods employed, p, and the number of periods since receiving UI, n. The minimum requirement i s t E periods for a new claimant ( n > 13) and t E + t ER periods for a repeater (n 13). Once a worker quali es for UI she may receive t R periods of extended bene ts. A quali ed worker employe d f o r h a l f a y ear or less receives one additional period of bene ts for each period worked and one additional period for each two periods employed after that, up to a maximum duration T of one year. (T = 13 since a period corresponds to four weeks). Therefore we can write the potential duration as 
Finally, the UI system is nanced through a at tax on wages. How this tax is incorporated into the policy simulations is discussed later on.
Worker's Problem
Workers maximize expected present v alue of income, discounted at rate w . While employed income equals the current w age w k . While unemployed income equals c w + b k where b k denotes the level of UI bene ts the person is eligible to collect based on the wage in the previous job, w k . While a worker is unemployed, a recall o er from the previous job arrives each period with probability r s . The wage attached to a recall is the previous wage the worker received on the job, because the match v alue M k survives the layo period. If the worker accepts a recall, she enters the next period employed at the same wage as her previous employment. If she does not receive a recall, or receives a recall and rejects it, then an outside job o er arrives with probability o s and some match v alue M k 0 . The worker can either accept or reject the o er. If no o er is accepted this period, the worker enters the next period unemployed. If the worker accepts an o er, she has made a new match, and enters the next period employed at the new wage w k 0 .
While employed each w orker expects to be laid o with probability l s each period and expects an outside job o er to arrive with probability j s . 3 Workers incur no cost when switching jobs and will take a n y outside job o er that is higher than the current w age or quit into unemployment. 4 3 To capture di erences in search i n tensity among unemployed and employed workers we assume that half of all job o ers go to unemployed workers (given that they search harder), and half go to employed workers. Since there is a much larger number of employed workers than unemployed workers, employed workers will face a lower job o er probability than unemployed workers. 4 A job o er can go to a worker just laid o in the same period, and if it is accepted the worker makes a job-to-job transition with no intervening unemployment. 8
The value of choices depends upon all aspects of the worker's situation. In the UI system described above a w orker's state vector takes the form (m k p n s Let V w (m k p n s) denote the value to the worker of beginning a period in state (m k p n s). The value function V w depends upon the current p a yo of the state and the expected value of the next period's state, (m 0 k 0 p 0 n 0 s 0 ). The transitions from the current state to the state next period depend upon the worker's decisions this period, whether she remains in the labor market next period, the decisions of rms, the draw o f m a t c h v alues, the evolution of the aggregate economy, and the UI system. Using Bellman's equation, we write the value function for an unemployed person (m = 0 ) a s The optimal decision at each state is summarized b y a reservation wage index k r = k r (m k p n s) and an indicator function I R = I R (k p n s). If m = 0 , t h e n k r = k r u equals the index of the lowest wage o er w k that the worker is willing to accept. If m = 1 , k r = k r e equals the lowest wage for which the worker is willing to stay employed for k < k r the worker quits the current j o b i n to unemployment o r t a k es a new job if an acceptable one arrives this period. The function I R indicates whether a currently unemployed worker is willing to accept a recall o er from the previous employer (I R = 1 ) o r n o t ( I R = 0). The decision to accept or reject a recall o er is di erent from the decision to accept an outside o er because of the value functions (7) and (8) 
Firm's Problem
The rm's problem is simpler than the worker's problem because rms are not directly a ected by the UI system. 5 If the rm's job is occupied at the beginning of the period, the rm can either lay o or retain the worker. Firms take a s g i v en a (state-contingent) probability l q s that a worker will quit a job before production begins. If the job is vacant at the beginning of the period, the rm can costlessly attempt to recall the worker who 5 The model assumes zero experience rating of UI claims attributable to a rm, which i s the case in Canada. This assumption can be relaxed to allow for experience rating, although it increases the length of the rm's belief vector. 10 previously held the job. Firms take a s g i v en a probability l r s that a recall o er will be accepted. If the o er is rejected or the rm has chosen to forgo recalling the previous worker, the rm can then choose to post an outside o er with cost c f 0. The contacted worker will accept the job if k exceeds her reservation wage index k r . Firms take a s g i v en the probability l o s that an outside worker will nd an o er acceptable. The state of the rm is described by t h e v ector (m h k i s) where m is the previous employment status of the job (1= lled, 0=vacant), h indicates whether the job is new (h = 1 ) or existing (h = 0), k is the index of the match v alue, and i is the index of the current rmspeci c shock. The one-period expected pro t for an existing rm (h = 0) can be written using the elements of the state vector and the decision vector d:
: where = is the expected value of worker-rm matches. The rst line equals the expected pro t associated with a job remaining lled. The second and third lines are expected revenue and the fourth is the expected cost associated with the decision to ll a vacant job. If a job is destroyed, the expected pro t is zero. For a new job (h = 1 a n d m = 0) expected pro t is
The rst term is the expected revenue from posting an o er and the second term is the expected cost. A recall and new o er cannot be made simultaneously to prevent spurious creation of new jobs. The simulation of l r s in the model economy rules out the possibility t h a t a w orker 11
can receive a recall o er after accepting an outside o er. In e ect, the rm loses track o f the worker once she takes another job, and the rm must post an outside o er to ll the vacancy. The value of a job given its current state is
Prob ( The rm also cannot keep track o f t h e w orker's availability for recall. This is similar to the assumption that workers cannot keep track o f a r m ' s activity but instead perceive constant l a yo and recall probabilities (conditional upon the aggregate state of the economy).
Equilibrium
Each v ector of beliefs and L determine probabilities of events occurring to agents on the other side of the market. That is, let I (L) denote the aggregate state-contingent probabilities of layo s, recalls, on-the-job job o ers, and unemployed job o ers implied by optimal rm behavior given rm beliefs L. Similarly, let L I ( ) denote the aggregate state contingent probabilities of quits, recall acceptances, and job o er acceptances implied by 12 optimal worker behavior given worker beliefs . Then an equilibrium is a xed point i n beliefs:
To nd a set of consistent beliefs of this form, we s i m ulate the labor market to compute probabilities of events given beliefs and optimal behavior based on those beliefs. The details of our simulation procedure are given in Appendix 3.
It may be instructive to compare this numerical model to the job matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . The probability o f a l a yo would become an exogenous parameter, the rate of match destruction in M&P. Existing but vacant j o b s w ould be permanently destroyed with certainty ( l d = 1). Workers would never be recalled by the same rm ( r s = 0). The UI system would be eliminated ( = 0) and quits would not be allowed (l q = 0). Reservation wages of workers would equal the wage associated with the largest idiosyncratic shock (M&P's best-available-technology assumption). On the other hand, Mortensen and Pissarides solve a w age bargaining model that takes into account (constant, public) outside alternatives and the total (constant, public) surplus generated by the match. In this respect our assumption of constant sharing of the match-speci c component alone is either ad hoc or requires the assumption that neither party can continue search during the bargaining process. It does, however, generate wage dynamics that are consistent w i t h t wo s t ylized facts. In particular, the best-available-technology assumption in M&P avoids the possibility that workers would reject job o ers, which simpli es the analysis, but it also implies that wages fall stochastically with tenure. Here, wages are constant with tenure, and our framework could be extended to allow for productivity that rises with tenure, although it would involve expansion of the rm's state space. Second, since the distribution of match v alues does not vary with the aggregate state in our model, wages of continuing jobs do not vary with the business cycle, although averages wages do vary because of selection processes. Observationally, a person's current w age does depend upon the state of the cycle in which the match 13 was formed. This is consistent with Beaudry and Dinardo (1991) who nd that, without correcting for selection of matches, a worker's current w age is more strongly related to the unemployment rate when the job began than the current o r i n tervening unemployment rates.
III. PARAMETERS
The Business Cycle
The Markov transition probabilities for the aggregate productivity s h o c ks are exogenous to the market equilibrium de ned in the previous section. The values used throughout the analysis are reported in Table 1C . The mean duration of each state and the probability o f movement b e t ween states is estimated using the autoregressive model suggested by Christiano (1991) . We assume, as in Mortensen (1994) , that the economy cannot move to a high state from a low state without passing through the middle state. The details of the procedure are provided in Appendix 2.
Based on P ss 0 in Table 1 the vector of ergodic probabilities for the Canadian data is ( 0 :171 0:657 0:171 ), implying, for example, that the model economy i s i n t h e l o w state 17% of the time. If the economy is in a boom or a slump, there is a 97.7% probability that it will remain in that state during the next period (month). If it does not remain in the same state, the economy m o ves to the middle state. If the economy is in the middle state there is a 98.8% chance that it will remain in that state the next period. If it does not remain in the middle state, it is equally likely that next period's state will be low or high.
Unemployment Insurance
The values chosen for the unemployment insurance parameters appearing in the dynamic programming problem for individuals are also reported in Table 1D . They were chosen to match as closely as possible the Canadian UI system in place throughout the 1980's. This period is chosen for two reasons. The UI rules were not changed from 1980 to 1989, and this 14 period includes a complete business cycle. (The 7.5% unemployment rate in 1980 is identical to the unemployment rate in 1989.) While there were no major changes to UI rules during the 1980s, the particular entrance requirements and bene t duration faced by w orkers during this period varied with the unemployment r a t e o ver time and across regions of the country. The parameters are based on the mean unemployment rate over this period of 9.4%. 6 For instance, the entrance requirement in Canada where the unemployment rate was 9.4% is 10 weeks in the model, the entrance requirement is 3 periods, or 12 weeks. The penalty for repeat users of UI was six weeks, in the model it is 2 periods. Eligible workers were paid one week of bene ts for each w eek worked up to 26 weeks, thereafter one week of bene ts were paid for each t wo w eeks worked. In the model, one period of bene ts are paid for each p e r i o d w orked up to 6 periods, thereafter one period of bene ts is earned for each two periods worked. Under an 9.4% unemployment rate, extended bene ts lasted 24 weeks (6 periods).
In the 1980s the earnings replacement ratio, , w as 60% of the previous wage up to the maximum insurable earnings and the minimum bene t is 20% of the maximum. T h e minimum and maximum bene t levels in Canada are calculated from a nominal maximum insurable weekly earnings level. To k eep the real maximum insurable earnings level fairly stable, the government adjusts the nominal maximum insurable earnings each y ear. The maximum insurable weekly earnings in 1986 (the base year for calculating real wages) is $495.
Chosen Parameters
Three parameter values were not chosen by tting them to aggregate data, government policy, o r t o m a t c h the model's simulated equilibrium to data. Their values are reported in Table 1B . The rm discount r a t e w as set to f = 0 :997, and as a four-week discount rate this 6 The feedback b e t ween the unemployment rate and UI eligibility is rightly considered an important element of the Canadian UI system (e.g. Milbourne et al. 1991 ). In our model this feature would require adding the unemployment rate in each aggregate state to the worker belief vector . 15 implies a 4% annual real interest rate. The worker discount rate is set to w = 0 :97 on the presumption that low-skill workers face a higher cost of borrowing than rms. The departure rate of workers from this market is set to l d = 0 :0083, which implies a mean duration until exit from the low skill market of 10 years.
Fitted Parameters
The remaining parameters were set following a (somewhat loose) matching of the moments generated from simulating the equilibrium of the model to moments derived from data on the labor market for Canadian men aged 20 to 24. Computational constraints, discussed in Appendix 2, kept us from truly matching the model's predictions to the chosen moments as well as possible. But this procedure did achieve its primary objective: to nd values of the model's parameters that would yield simulations similar to actual outcomes in the Canadian labor market. This procedure increases con dence that the patterns found in our policy simulations are similar to those that would be found in a fully estimated version of the model. We c hoose the young male demographic group for comparison based on three reasons. First, the business cycle is taken as exogenous, so our model is best thought of as a partial equilibrium model of one segment of the labor market. In a general equilibrium, c hanges in UI policy would induce responses in the pattern of aggregate shocks. Second, young men typically have relatively high rates of unemployment and receipt of UI bene ts. Measuring how the market for their labor responds to the UI system is likely to provide an upper bound for the overall e ect. Third, the Canadian UI system includes a large maternity leave component. Not including young women in our data avoids the di culty of modeling the e ect of maternity on reservation wages and decisions to quit jobs.
The tted parameters include: the absolute value of the aggregate shock ( h ), the vacant job destruction rate (l d ), the rm's cost of hiring a new worker (c f ), the worker's value of being unemployed for one period (c w ), the worker share of the match v alue ( ), the 16 mean ( ) and standard deviation ( ) o f w age o ers, and the absolute value of the largest idiosyncratic productivity shock ( B). The moments chosen to match are the means and standard deviations of the unemployment rate, the proportion of people receiving UI within a period, and mean wages. Appendix 2 provides more details.
The parameters found by (partial) matching of simulated moments to data moments are presented in Table 1 . The worker's value of remaining unemployed c w is low relative t o the mean wages because workers obtain most of the bene t from unemployment through UI payments and through the higher probability of nding a job when unemployed than when working. On the other hand, the rm's cost of hiring a worker c f is slightly greater than the mean wage in the labor market. The worker receives about 80% of the match v alue. Comparing B to h , w e see the range of the idiosyncratic shocks is much larger than that of wages and aggregate shocks. The model requires a lot of volatility within the life of a match t o c r e a t e a n i n c e n tive for rms to lay w orkers o . On the other hand, if the market experiences a good aggregate shock, there is a high probability that it will experience a good aggregate shock next period. Therefore, a smaller value of the aggregate shock will su ce to have an e ect on rm actions.
Parameter Values for Policy Experiments
The equilibrium under the Baseline policy that held in Canada during the 1980s is compared to two other policies: the elimination of UI altogether (NoUI), and the rules introduced since 1990 (NewUI). The simplest way to eliminate UI bene ts payments to workers in the model is to change the replacement rate to zero. This is done for the rst simulation. However, UI does not only a ect the economy in terms of bene ts. It also a ects taxes paid by rms and workers. To incorporate this feature into the model, elimination of UI must also eliminate taxes paid on wages into the UI Fund. Since payroll taxes are paid on wages not match v alues, the share of the match retained by the rm now m ust be separated 17 from the wages paid to the worker. Hence, under a system of no UI, the pro t (3) becomes s + w k ; (1 + )w k + i (14) where represents the tax rate on wages which i s removed under the alternative s i m ulation. In the base simulation, = 0, meaning the match v alue in the rm's pro t function includes all taxes. In the alternative simulation, = ;0:04, which approximates the total proportion of wages paid into the Canadian UI Fund by r m s a n d w orkers from 1980 to early 1993. 7 In 1990, 1993 and 1994 the Canadian government i n troduced a series of signi cant changes to the UI system. 8 For a geographical area similar to the case assumed for the base simulation, the entrance requirement rose from 10 weeks to 16 weeks. Regional extended bene ts were reduced from 24 weeks to 20 weeks, the maximum duration of bene ts from 49 weeks to 44 weeks, lowered the replacement ratio to .50, disquali ed persons who quit or were red with cause completely, and increased the payroll tax rate by t wo percentage points. 9 Table 1D shows how these changes a ect the model's UI policy parameters. The disquali cation of quitters is approximated by c hanging the transition function governing the bene ts of workers who leave employment to become unemployed. 10 The new transition function is given in Appendix 1. Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 2 summarize simulations of the equilibrium response to the three policy regimes described in the last section using the parameter values (in Table 1) found by loosely matching the baseline case to empirical moments (in Table 2 ). First, the empirical moments and the moments simulated from the baseline policy show similar 7 The actual rate varied from 2:4% to over 6%. 8 Yet another a set of changes to UI was introduced in 1996. These changes were not include in this analysis. 9 The federal government originally introduced regional extended bene ts as an add-on to UI payable out of federal co ers. The new extended bene ts are payable by the UI Fund. 10 To properly introduce the e ect of the disquali cation of quitters requires a separate reservation wage for employed workers who are laid o and those who are not. 18 patterns across the cycle with some di erences in the levels of the moments. The average unemployment rates are matched closely. The rate of UI receipt is somewhat lower in the baseline simulations and mean wages are somewhat higher. The standard deviation of the moments within business cycle states are higher in the data than in the baseline simulation. This is perhaps not surprising since the aggregate producitivity in the model are constant within states, but in reality s h o c ks are a ecting the labor market at all time. It is worth noting again that the set of parameters in Table 1 are not the best possible tting parameters due to the amount of time required to solve for equilibrium beliefs. However, the mean levels are similar enough to have con dence that the policy simulations yield patterns that are relevant for the actual labor market.
IV. POLICY SIMULATIONS
The other columns of Table 2 show h o w the moments respond to policies. Not suprisingly, eliminating UI leads to a lower unemployment rate in all aggregate states. In each case unemployment drops to about 60% of the baseline levels. Another way t o l o o k a t t h i s change is to attribute a share of this`excess' unemployment under the Baseline to each person that receives UI under the Baseline. By aggregate state (low t o h i g h ) e a c h U I m o n th is associated with .73, .93, and .74 of another unemployment m o n th, respectively. W eighted by the long run probabilities of each state, each U I m o n th is associated with .86 more months of equilibirum unemployment a b o ve the NoUI equilibrium. This response is higher that the actual proportion of people receiving UI in the Baseline model. The Baseline simulation itself underpredicts the rate of UI use among young Canadian men at these parameter values. This means the .86 value could overstate the impact of UI on unemployment since the denominator is smaller than in the data. On the other hand, parameter values that better t the data might imply a lower unemployment rate without UI, so it is not known whether .86 is an understatement o r o verstatement. In any e v ent, the UI system appears to have a p o t e n tially large e ect on the unemployment when the equilibrium responses to the policy work themselves out. Mean wages also fall without UI, essentially because less productive match v alues are employed due to the incentive t o w ork.
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What is surprising is that unemployment rates go up in each aggregate state under the New UI rules. The changes in the rules essentially move the UI system towards No UI`on paper' but it does not move the economy unambiguously towards the No UI equilibrium. There is only a slight drop in rates of UI receipt. Since the rules cut bene t eligibility a n d duration, this lack of response must come through the changed labor market equilibrium. In terms of excess unemployment the e ects is more dramatic. For each U I m o n th the New UI rules generate 1.31, 1.61, and 1.06 months of unemployment across the business cycle states. The long-run average is 1.46: each t wo people on UI can be thought of as generating a third unemployed person not receiving UI through the changes in rm and worker decisions generated by the UI policy. The New UI rules move m e a n w ages down, although the size of the change is small enough to be explain mainly by the increased payroll tax rate included in the New UI parameters. Table 3 compares equilibrium beliefs held by w orkers ( ) and rms (L) under each o f t h e policies. First, consider the Baseline vectors. Some patterns are relatively straightforward. Layo probabilities are monotonic (and counter-cyclical) across the business cycle (indicated by à >' b e l o w t h e v ector). Quit, recall o ers, and unemployed job o er probabilities are all pro-cyclical. However, recall acceptances are counter-cyclical: laid o workers belief (rightly) that the probability of being recalled is higher during a recession than a boom. And two vectors of beliefs are not monotonic across the cycle. On-the-job o er probabilities reach a mininum and o er acceptance probabilities reach a maximum in the middle state, not in one of the two extreme states. While the existence of three aggregate states adds a great deal to the computational burden, these non-monotonic e ects in the equilibrium beliefs indicate that a two-state model may mask some important asymmetries between booms and recessions due to the dynamic elements of job matching and the Canadian UI system. Next, consider the equilibrium response of beliefs across the business cycle. Relativeto the Baseline simulation there are twelve v ectors of beliefs across states to compare. In only half of these vectors is the change in beliefs monotonic across business cycle (indicated by either three or zero`^'s in each b l o c k of probabilities). Most of these monotonic changes occur when eliminating UI altogether. This would result in lower layo and quit probabilities and greater job o er probabilities while unemployed. O ers on-the-job are less likely, w h i c h is driven by the greater employment l e v els in all three aggregate states. Recall o ers are also lower without UI, presumably because the lack of UI leads more layo s to be`permanent', i.e. less a ected by the time-varying idiosyncratic shocks. Two b e l i e f v ectors do not respond monotonically to eliminating UI. Firms believe i t m o r e l i k ely that o ers and recalls are accepted during recession but less likely in the middle and boom states than in the Baseline.
Equilibrium Beliefs
The changes in beliefs induced by recent c hanges to the UI rules are not so straightforward and in several cases the opposite of those generated by removal of UI altogether. Recall from Table 2 that unemployment rates are higher under the (stricter) NewUI parameters than under the Baseline parameters. These changes lead to greater layo and recall probabilities among workers. At the same time rms also expect workers to be more likely to accept recalls. Altogether, these changes indicate that tighter UI eligibility a n d l o wer bene ts can lead to more short term layo s based on the idiosyncratic shocks to revenue. Rather than discouraging use of the system, the changes can lead to more use.
The increase in temporary layo s in the New UI equilibrium re ects the interface between rms and attached workers. These increases are accompanied by a m biguous e ects on the interface between rms and unattached workers. For example, job o er probabilities are higher in recession despite the fact that there are more unemployed competing for o ers in the NewUI equilibrium. In the other states outside o er probabilities go down. This pattern is a mirror re ection of the o er acceptance beliefs held by rms. They expect more o ers to be accepted in booms under NewUI (relative to the Baseline) but fewer in the other states.
Finally, note the changes in monotonicity (marked bỳ >') across the business cycle across UI policy regimes. Three belief vectors are monotonic in all three policies: layo s, recalls,and recall acceptances. On-the-job o er probabilities are monotonic in none of the regimes. The remaining four beliefs exhibit di erent patterns across the policies. Perhaps the most interesting one is that job o er probabilities are pro-cyclical in the Baseline and NoUI but they reach a mininum in the middle state under the NewUI parameters. This indicates in yet another way that the dynamics within the UI system interact in a very complicated way with the dynamics of the business cycle. Figure 2 shows the simulated time path of selected variables under the three policy regimes. The graphs cover more than a full business cycle. During the simulations the duration of the aggregate states is equal to their average durations. The boom (s = h) a n d recession (s = l) periods are shown along the timeline in Figure 2A . It shows that the three policy regimes have mainly a level e ect on the unemployment rate. Under the New UI rules the rate is nearly the same by the end of a (average) boom as under the Baseline, but during middle states and recessions it is several percentage points higher. The pattern in mean duration of unemployment spells (below in Figure 2C ) is more complex, since it is composed of both an incidence and a (pure) duration e ect. At the beginning of a boom mean durations go up slightly in all three regimes, as the change in the aggregate state leads many rms to issue recalls, eliminating many l a yo s due to idiosyncratic shocks. After that mean duration steadily falls as more and more workers take jobs, which a r r i v e at a higher rate (Table 3) . Since there are fewer vacant jobs there are fewer jobs totally destroyed, so fewer unemployed lose contact with their rms altogether. Interestingly, mean duration of unemployment i s much less sensitive to cyclical conditions under NoUI. By the end of the average boom the mean duration under NoUI is higher than in the other two regimes. When the economy g o e s into recession there is a short-term drop in duration as many rms respond with layo s. Then durations rise slowly under all three regimes. The peak in duration actually occurs when the economy m o ves back i n to the middle period, again generated by the recall of many 22
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short-term layo s.
The pattern in mean wages (2B) is somewhat similar. During a boom mean wages fall, in part because lower-valued matches are now viable. At the start of the recession there is a corresponding increase in mean wages as low m a t c hes generate layo s. This e ect is not very pronounced under the Baseline and No UI regimes, and during the recession mean wages grow slowly. Under the New UI rules, however, mean wages increase more sharply and thereby peak at the end of the recession.
The patterns in wages and unemployment rates re ect, in part, a very complicated pattern in reservation wages among the unemployed ( Figure 2D ). This in turn is determined by t h e i n terplay of equilibrium beliefs across states. First, note that the pattern for NoUI is very abrupt, because under NoUI workers are spread over only a few states (primarily the wage of the previous match, which a ects the value of a recall o er). Under NoUI reservation wages go up during a boom, driven primarily by the higher rate of job o ers, making job search more productive. However, with a UI system in place reservation wages fall quickly during a boom. Job o er probabilities are very similar (Table 3) , so this is caused by t h e unemployed wanting to get any job to establish a match and build up eligibility for UI while o ers are available. This strategy is helped by the higher job o er rate during booms and leads to the higher quit rate than the NoUI case. These quits are mainly job-to-job transfers as employed workers can receive o ers while holding a low-value match. During the recession reservation wages increase under the Baseline and (particularly) the NewUI regime. This re ects the combine e ects of UI eligbility and altered layo and recall policies of rms. Unemployed workers are less likely to accept outside o ers under the NewUI rules because they are receiving UI bene ts and are expecting recalls. Both of these e ects are missing in the NoUI case. What is surprising is that the Baseline equilibrium falls between the two. In e ect, the modest reduction in UI eligbility creates a greater response by rms (in terms of layo and recall decisions) to outweigh the worker reaction. 23
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has carried out experiments on the long run e ects of changes in unemployment insurance policies based on an equilibrium model of the labor market in a cyclical economy. The model takes into account the details of the Canadian UI system. Our notion of equilibrium beliefs makes it feasible to compute how w orkers and rms respond to UI policy and the business cycle in terms of job search, job o ers, layo s, recalls, and quits. The equilibrium analysis shows that changes in policy parameters can have unintended e ects on the long run equilibrium. In particular, we nd that tightening eligiblity requirements leads to greater unemployment and only a small drop in UI incidence in the simulated economy. Our results also indicate that the new UI rules in Canada incorporated in our model create excess amounts of unemployment in equilibrium: e a c h m o n th nearly three people are unemployed for every two people on UI that would not be unemployed without UI. This is a higher ratio than under the Baseline policy in which fewer than one unemployed person is generated for every UI case each m o n th.
The business cycle aspect of our analysis appears important. The equilibrium responses to the three policy regimes we simulate do di er across the business cycle. For example, the new UI regime tends to exasperate recessions more than the baseline regime. These asymmetries are caused in part by the dynamic element of the UI rules such as eligibility requirements and bene ts that depending on past wages. Thus, the added cost of computing equilibria in the model with three aggregate states and several state variables for individuals appears to have p r o ved worthwhile.
Our results are far from being precise estimates on the impact of UI on the Canadian economy. However, our results are highly suggestive and are only conceivable within an equilibrium model of the labor market that takes into account details of government policy. Evidence drawn from econometric studies of individual response to UI bene t levels (such as Meyer 1990) and from estimates of short run responses to policy changes (such Baker 24 and Rea 1993 or Green and Riddell 1993) are clearly important parts of policy analysis, but neither type of study can account for long run e ects, which m a y either dampen or accentuate individual responses. Development of large-scale equilibrium models to simulate long run e ects of policy changes should be seen as an important complementary element t o traditional program evaluation.
APPENDIX 1: TRANSITION FUNCTIONS Workers
The transitions from the current state to the next for remaining workers depend upon the occurrence of o ers, layo s and recalls, the current w age, reservation wage and o ered wage in each state, and the UI system. The occurrence of o ers, layo s and recalls and the level of the o ered wage can be summarized by three random elements: , e , a n d k o , where e and U(0 1) and k o are i.i.d. and drawn from a uniform distribution over the discrete values 1 2 : : : N w . If the worker is unemployed, then a recall is received if These are perhaps best illustrated by an example. Mary is unemployed with 12 periods UI remaining at a bene t level denoted by k = 2. The economy is in a recession (s = s l ). The period is t ; 1 and it is almost over. Her state in period t ; 1 i s fm k p n sg = f0 2 12 0 s l g. Now Mary is getting prepared for period t. The state of the economy in period t is revealed: s = s l . Mary has not received a recall from her previous job. She receives a job o er at k = 5 for period t. Therefore Mary decides which is greater, V (0 2 11 0 s l ) o r V (1 5 1 1 s l ) . The value of k for which V (0 2 11 0 s l ) = V (1 k 1 1 s l ), is the reservation wage for the state f0 2 11 0 s l g. Mary's reservation wa g e i n s t a t e f0 2 11 0 s l g is k r u = 4. She accepts the job in period t, and is employed for that period. Her state in period t can be described by f1 5 1 1 s l g, which simply says she is employed at k = 5, for one period (p = 1), has not received UI for one period (n = 1) and the aggregate shock i s l o w. Now period t + 1 is about 27 to begin. Mary now knows the economy i s m o ving into a medium level of output, s = s m in period t + 1. She has not been laid o , but has received an outside job o er. She must now decide whether to remain employed at the current w age, quit, or accept the new job o er. If she quits, she does not qualify for UI. The value of k for which V (1 k 2 2 s m ) = V (0 5 0 0 s m ) is the reservation wage for state f1 5 2 2 0g. I f k r e <= 5 Mary will continue to work. If k o > 5 she will change jobs.
NewUI modi es the transition functions to
0 if m = 1 a n d m 0 = 0 a n d e > l s (not layed o ) or m = 1 a n d m 0 = 0 a n d p < t E or m = 1 a n d m 0 = 0 a n d w k < w min minfy p =2 + p=2 + t R T g if m = 1 a n d m 0 = 0 a n d e l s and p t E and w k w min where the rst line takes account of the disquali cation of quitters. All data are from monthly seasonally adjusted (MSA) series. The last date used is March 1993, since major changes to UI regulations came into e ect April 1, 1993. Data on wages of men 20 to 24 are not available in MSA series. To approximate the wages available in a low skilled labor market, the wages for service sector workers are used. These are transformed into real wages using the consumer price index. The unemployment rate for males 20 to 24 is available from CanSim. UI regular bene t claimants are available for the 20 to 24 year age group, but not by sex. The UI claimant series for the model is calculated according to: Moment M a t c hing
The other parameters besides P ss 0 in Table 1C where 
was used as the objective while adjusting the parameters of the model. The weights (w lv ) and moments are reported in Table 2 . Recall that calculation of the equilibrium beliefs requires repeatedly solving the dynamic programming problems, simulating the economy, and updating the belief vectors. While changing the parameter values we set the size of the simulation small (in terms of the number of workers and rms and the number of discrete shocks) and the precision of the simulation loose (in terms of the convergence criteria for the belief vectors and the value functions). The values used in this stage are listed in Table 1A . Furthermore, the objective function is not continuous in the choice variables which implies that a non-gradient algorithm be used for minimizing the objective. These considerations make it impractical to converge to the nal minimizing values. The results reported are based on values after approximately one month of time on an IBM SP-2 parallel processing machine with eight nodes. Once this process was stopped the size and precision of the simulations was increased considerably, as indicated in Table 1A , for the precise calculation of beliefs under alternative policy regimes.
APPENDIX 3. SOLUTION METHOD
To begin the iterative procedure, initial values are chosen for the vector of probabilities (beliefs) held by w orkers and rms about their labor market opportunities, denoted 0 and L 0 , bounded away from 0 and 1. There are then four steps in each iteration:
1 Solve the worker and rm maximization problems by iterating on the respective v alue functions V w and V f . 2 Based on the optimal behavior of rms and workers, simulate the labor market over a large number of periods for a large number of workers and rms. 3 F rom the simulated data, calculate the probabilities 1 and L 1 that result from the joint behavior of workers and rms given their beliefs 0 and L 0 . 4 Adjust the beliefs to be a weighted average of the initial beliefs and the simulated probabilities.
Steps 1-4 are repeated until the vectors of new and initial beliefs converge. Then the model's parameters are adjusted to close the gap between simulated and empirical moments.
Details of step 1
Both the worker and rm maximization problems are solved by b a c kward iteration on their respective Bellman's equations. The solution is achieved when the equation for each possible state the worker/ rm can reach is stationary that is to say, t h e v alue of making a decision in a given state is independent of the time period. For each state attainable by the worker, the solution to the worker problem yields a vector of reservation wages for both employed and unemployed workers, and an index which indicates whether an unemployed worker is willing to accept a recall to her previous job. For each state attainable by the rm, the solution to the rm problem yields a vector of yes/no decisions whether to post an o er for a newly created job, recall a previous worker for an existing vacant job, issue a recall and if refused post an outside o er for an existing vacant j o b , o r l a yo an employed worker.
Details of step 2 32
The rst step in simulating the labor market is to specify a business cycle pattern set for the entire simulation. The model is simulated for a large number of workers and periods (see Table 1A ). To reduce time to reach a solution, the business cycle follows a deterministic pattern based on the expected duration of each phase of the cycle. Next, initial values are chosen for the state of each simulated worker and rm. Each w orker and rm is given an identi cation (id) number to keep track of them throughout the simulation. For simplicity (and without loss of generality), the worker begins the simulation attached to a rm with the same id number. Workers can begin the simulation employed or unemployed, with or without unemployment insurance. Whether employed or not, workers are assigned a wage index. This determines their wage if employed and their level of unemployment insurance premiums if unemployed and quali ed for unemployment insurance. The wage index and employment status of the worker determines the initial wage index and vacancy status ( lled or empty) of the corresponding rm's job. The percentage of workers employed and jobs lled in the rst period is chosen, but the remainder of the assignments to states for both workers and rms are random.
After setting the initial values the simulation follows the sequence of actions illustrated in Figure 1 . We will describe the process in terms of last period, this period, a n d next period. Both rms and workers enter this period in their nal state from last period. All updating changes this period's state. A w orker or rm can be updated more than once if a worker refuses a recall and then accepts an outside job o er. Because only last period's state is pertinent to all worker and rm decisions, only the nal changes made to this period's state carry forward into next period. Before this period ends, a percentage of rms with empty jobs are destroyed randomly with probability l d and replaced by new rms with the same id numbers and vacant jobs. A percentage of workers also leave the labor market and are replaced by new workers who are unemployed and have no prior work experience. When employed workers leave the labor market, the corresponding rm's nal state from last period is changed from job lled to job empty. 33
Before this period begins, two lists are created based on last period's nal state: the id numbers of employed workers and the id numbers of unemployed workers. When outside job o ers are posted, the o er is issued randomly to a worker on the list of employed workers with probability l e . Before any action is taken this period, the decision vectors for the new rms are examined, and if the rm wishes to make an o er its id number is added to a list of such rms. If the rm does not wish to make an o er, it is updated as a potential new job for the next period.
Recall and layo decisions for all rms are completed before any outside o ers are issued. The element o f e a c h rm's decision vector that determines whether the rm wants to recall its worker is examined and the following events occur:
No recall: the rm's state for this period is updated. If the worker is still attached to this rm, her state is also updated as remaining unemployed.
Recall: If the worker's job id no longer matches this rm's id, then the worker cannot be contacted and the rm can decide to post an outside o er. If the rm's decision is not to post an o er the job remains un lled until the beginning of next period. If the rm wants to post an outside o er its id is added to a list of such rms for this period. If the worker is still attached to this rm, her recall index determines whether or not she will accept the recall. If the recall is accepted, the worker returns to work at the previous wage and the job is again lled. If the recall is rejected, the worker remains unemployed, and the rm's decision to post an outside o er is examined as if the worker had not been contacted.
For a lled job, the rm's decision vector indicates if the rm will layo the worker. If yes, the rm is updated with the job now v acant, and the worker is updated as unemployed. If no, the worker's reservation wage is examined to see if she will quit. If the rm does not layo the worker and the worker does not quit, the rm is updated with the job remaining lled and the worker is updated as still employed. If the worker quits, the rm is updated with the job now v acant and the worker is updated as unemployed going into next period. Note, at this point, the worker's state ending last period and coming into this one is still 34 employed. Therefore, the worker is still included in the list of employed workers available for job o ers.
After all rms have completed their layo and recall processes, the list of rms that wish to issue o ers is processed. First, the decision whether to send the o er to an employed or unemployed person is determined randomly based on the proportion of o ers destined for each group. A second random assignment determines to which w orker on the appropriate list the job o er will be directed. The process to determine whether the o er is accepted or rejected depends on whether the worker is employed or unemployed.
If the worker is unemployed (from last period) but has already accepted a recall, then the worker's id is removed from the list and the new job o er is directed to another unemployed worker. Once the o er reaches a still-available worker, the worker's reservation wage determines if she will accept the o er. If the worker accepts the o er she is updated as employed by the issuing rm and the rm is updated as employing the new worker. If the worker rejects the o er, the worker remains unemployed and the rm's job remains vacant going into next period.
If the worker is employed, it must be determined whether the worker has been laid o or not. If the worker has been laid o , the job is accepted if the o ered wage matches or exceeds the worker's reservation wage. If the o er is accepted, the rm is updated with the job lled by the new worker and the worker is updated as employed by the new rm. If the worker has not been laid o , the job is accepted if the o ered wage exceeds the worker's existing wage. If the o er is accepted, the rm is updated with the job lled by the new worker the worker is updated as employed by the new rm and the worker's previous rm is updated as having its job vacant. If the o er is rejected, the rm is updated as having its job remain vacant. The worker at this point does not need to be updated, since her state was determined during the rst round of rm decisions.
Finally, all workers who are unemployed and who did not receive o ers or recalls are updated as remaining unemployed. 35
Details of Step 3
For each s i m ulated period, the recall, o er, on-the-job o er, and layo probabilities facing the worker are calculated. The recall probability is calculated as the number of recalls issued, whether or not they reach the worker, divided by t h e n umber of unemployed workers. The o er probability is calculated as the number of o ers issued to unemployed workers divided by the sum of the number of unemployed workers minus the number of unemployed workers who have accepted recalls this period. The on-the-job o er probability i s t h e n umber of o ers issued to employed workers divided by t h e n umber of employed workers. The layo probability is the number of layo s issued divided by t h e n umber of employed workers.
For each period, the probabilities for recall acceptances, job o er acceptances, and quits faced by rms are calculated. The probability that a recall is accepted equals the number of recalls accepted divided by the number of recalls issued, whether or not they reached the worker. The probability that an o er is accepted equals the number of o ers accepted by both unemployed workers and employed workers divided by n umber o ers issued. The probability t h a t a w orker quits a job equals the number of workers who quit their job, either to go into unemployment o r t o c hange job, divided by t h e n umber of employed workers.
At the end of each period, the vector of probabilities are assigned to the state of the economy in that period. These are averaged over all periods with the same state after discarding a number of periods to clear the e ects of initial conditions.
Details of Step 4
Each of the new probabilities in 1 and L 1 is compared to the corresponding initial belief in 0 and L 0 . There are 21 such probabilities, 12 in and 9 in L. If the di erence between any one element of the initial belief and simulated probability v ectors falls outside the tolerance, the model is not yet solved.
The beliefs are adjusted according to:
where r v 2 (0 1] is the revision rate for the probabilities. Because the simulations are nite, the calculated probabilities are not continuous. Thus the belief vectors do not exhibit smooth convergence. Instead, they will continue to bounce around within some range that depends upon the size of the state spaces for workers and rms (which depend upon UI policies and other parameters) and the number of workers/ rms in the simulation. When carrying out policy experiments (based on very large simulated economies) the iterations were simply run until none of the probabilities exhibited any trend over simulations. We ensured that at the end of the iterations the belief vectors had negligible variation (caused by the discreteness) compared to the di erence in belief vectors across policies. ^ indicates the probability to the left is higher than the corresponding value under the baseline policy. > indicates that the vector of beliefs above are monotonic across the business cycle.
